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Cerebral lateralization and religion: a phenomenological approach
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ABSTRACT
Both animal ethology and studies of the attentional styles of the two
cerebral hemispheres in human subjects suggest that there is a degree
of specialization, with the left hemisphere tending to focus more
narrowly on detail, and the right hemisphere supporting sustained
attention across a broad field. This has clear survival advantages. It also
has consequences at the phenomenological level of integrated
experience. Although both hemispheres are involved in all experience,
the characteristics of right hemisphere phenomenology, in particular its
greater capacity to sustain ambiguity, understand meaning that lies
beyond language, and perceive systemic wholes, means that it is more
likely to be able to accommodate religious thought and experience.
Since critiques of religion tend to have the opposite characteristics
(those of left hemisphere phenomenology), arguments about the nature
and meaning of religion may depend on which hemisphere’s “version”
of the world is privileged. Some consequent metaphysical,
epistemological and ethical issues are explored, drawing on brain
studies and a range of other disciplinary and experiential perspectives.
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1.1. The rationale of this paper at the phenomenological level
A consensus is emerging from the literature that religious experience tends to be associated with the
right hemisphere. This conclusion is supported by a book-length study of spirituality and the brain
(Trimble, 2007), by the comprehensive review of Devinsky and Lai (2008), and by McNamara
(2009). McNamara largely implicates right fronto-temporal networks, a view supported by Trimble
and Freeman (2006) and by Devinsky and Lai (2008), the latter of whom distinguish what they call
the “religion of the everyday man,” with its characteristic ongoing belief pattern and set of convic-
tions, predominantly localized to the frontal region, from ecstatic religious experience, more loca-
lized to the temporal region, both in the right hemisphere.
As this suggests, much depends on what is meant by religion. In some studies what is
measured is essentially a pathological hyper-religiosity; in others an openness to ritual; in others
the holding of certain beliefs or practices; in others experiences of a “paranormal” kind. As if to
demonstrate difficulties with generalization, in one study the right hemisphere appeared founda-
tional for aesthetic religious experience, while the left hemisphere was associated with ritual reli-
gious experience (Butler, McNamara, & Durso, 2011), a distinction that, however it may work in
the laboratory, falls short of the complexity of real life experience. Meanwhile, other studies have
linked types of meditation in which self/other boundaries are blurred with decreased activity in the
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right inferior parietal lobule, an area known to be critical to the sense of the self (Johnstone &
Glass, 2008).
It is important to note that this body of research is not reductive in intent, nor is this paper. Trim-
ble’s book is explicitly non-reductionist about religion and roams well beyond deductions from the
psychopathology of epilepsy into art, music, poetry and religious experience of “normals.”He writes:
“humankind is distinguished from other animals by several fundamental behaviours [he lists seven]
… . quintessentially driven by the right hemisphere” (p. 213). McNamara emphasizes that he is “not
interested in debunking religion’s supposed pretensions or calling it ‘nothing but… ’” (xiii); and he
makes clear that the right hemisphere is integral to religious experience in general, not just in, for
example, Parkinson’s disease, on which some of his findings are based: “[t]he functionally integrated
religion-related brain circuit… nearly always includes the key nodes of the amygdala, the right
anterior temporal cortex, and the right prefrontal cortex” (p. xi).
The purpose of this paper is to consider the issues of brain asymmetry and religion from the
standpoint of the phenomenology of each hemisphere, and how that may contribute to an under-
standing of the religious sense. I appreciate that a cognitivist approach requires a more explicitly
mechanistic model, but since our understanding is inevitably bound up with the model we use,
and since the experiential level is often left out when such a model is applied, this paper adopts
an explicitly phenomenological perspective, attending not just to cognition, but to the affective,
somatic and spiritual aspects of human experience as a whole.
Attention can be profitably considered at a level superior to that of each perceptual modality: for
example, Goodale and Milner’s (1992) influential visual model also applies to hearing (and probably
to othermodalities) (e.g., Zündorf, Lewald, &Karnath, 2016). Individuals with attentional neglect caused
by a right hemisphere stroke donot just fail to seepeople to their left, they donot hear them, and they even
have tactile andolfactorydeficits in the left hemispace—inotherwords theydonot attend (Bellas,Novelly,
Eskenazi, & Wasserstein, 1988; Schwartz, Marchok, Kreinick, & Flynn, 1979; Schwartz, Marchok, &
Flynn, 1977). Attention is not best thought of as a (primarily visual) “function” alongside other functions,
but as an aspect of consciousness (machines cannot attend) which is foundational: it brings the experi-
ential world into being. Half that world may go missing for a subject with a right hemisphere stroke.
Before continuing further, it may be helpful to clear some possiblemisunderstandings whichmight
be anticipated in talking about the phenomenological worlds generated by each cerebral hemisphere.
If I were to say “there are fascinating and important differences between a cat and a mouse,” there
are a number of valid responses which would nonetheless miss the point. One might be “they have
more in common than they have different,” which is true, but irrelevant, because sometimes it is the
differences that matter. Another might be of the kind: “we find that in order to see the world they
both use a similar combination of specific visual systems (involving the optic tracts and radiations,
tectum, visual cortex, basal ganglia),” and so on; this is also true, but irrelevant, since they both “see”
the world (and perceive the world in other modalities) differently, and construe the world cognitively
in different ways, make sense of it in different ways, which are reflected in different types of behav-
ioral responses that can be experimentally examined. These are not each single independent facts
that have to be strung together, or extended from one area, say vision, to another, say audition,
because they are all part of one large underlying difference, which makes sense of the whole: what
it means and what it takes to lead two very different types of life, that of the predatory cat and
that of the timorous mouse. The basic mechanisms that help them see are irrelevant, not just because
they are largely held in common by cat and by mouse, but because it is the wrong level of focus. It
would be like trying to explain the difference between Fox News and CNN by focussing on the mech-
anics of studio lighting, TV signal transmission, cathode ray tubes, plasma/LED screens, etc.
It may be responded that “the hemispheres are parts of a mechanism, not separate conscious
beings.” But that is also a mistake. A machine and a person are both just models that illuminate
and obscure different aspects of what they model. The brain isn’t actually either simply a machine
or simply a person. Each hemisphere can obviously sustain consciousness on its own, and appears
to have not just different cognitive strategies, but different goals, values, opinions and emotional
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timbre, a fact which becomes apparent as soon as one hemisphere, for whatever reason, loses func-
tion, as well as following commissurotomy, and can even be demonstrated in normal subjects. The
“person” model looks like a better fit than the “machine” model, especially since a hemisphere is at
least a manifestly important part of a person. This view was not just that of Sperry and Bogen, who
are well known to have seen the hemispheres as distinct personalities, but also of more recent
researchers in the area of hemisphere difference.
1.2. The hemisphere hypothesis
In a book called The Master and his Emissary: The Divided Brain and the Making of the Western
World (TMAHE) (McGilchrist, 2009), I put forward a thesis about the controversial question of
the origins and survival value of a divided and asymmetrical brain. In this paper I intend to give
only the briefest possible outline of the thesis, before quickly moving on to a consideration of its
implications for a religious (or spiritual) understanding of the world. No attempt will be made
here to give evidence or argument in favor of the thesis itself: these are presented at length in
TMAHE and explicitly lie outside the scope of this paper.
Many of the findings of neuroscience simply offer us a description of the brain correlates of
human experience. As such they offer a description of experience at a reduced level, but do not
directly illuminate the nature of that experience. Indeed, it is argued by certain philosophers that
the brain cannot tell us anything about experience that we could not have discovered by introspec-
tion, since by definition the “inwardness” of mental life has to be the authority on experience.
The thesis of TMAHE is, I believe, different in this regard. It suggests that knowledge about
reliable differences between the cerebral hemispheres can tell us something of considerable impor-
tance about our mental world which would not easily be discoverable by introspection, since, for
reasons of survival, nature has taken care to hide it from us. Awareness of it would bring life to a
standstill.
The argument can be very briefly stated. In Darwinian terms, there is a need to be able to feed and
to keep a look out for predators at one and the same time. This requires the bringing to bear of dia-
metrically opposed types of attention to the world simultaneously: one, narrow-beam, sharply
focussed, fragmentary, already committed to its object; the other, broad, open, sustained, vigilant
and uncommitted as to what it might find. This is a difficult feat. The solution adopted by all reptiles,
birds, fish, and mammals so far studied is a divided brain, in which the two halves remain sufficiently
distinct to function independently, but sufficiently connected to function in concert. This is also,
unsurprisingly, the case in humans, where the evidence is that the left hemisphere (LH) tends to
yield the first type of attention, and the right hemisphere (RH) the second (e.g., van Zomeren &
Brouwer, 1994).
Since the nature of attention, the way in which we attend, governs the nature of the world that
comes to attention, and since each hemisphere on its own is capable of yielding a coherent experi-
ential world, two radically different types of attention should lead to two radically different experi-
ential worlds, with different qualities, goals and values. Evidence from a wealth of sources, including
brain insults (traumatic injury, stroke, tumor, etc.), neuropsychological experiments in normal and
post-commissurotomy subjects, and brain imaging in a range of modalities suggests that this is
indeed the case. (I should say, at this point, that I am aware that a hemisphere on its own cannot
be said to do what only a person can do: “believe,” “intend,” “decide,” “like,” and so on. These
and similar formulations should be understood as avoiding the repetition of such cumbersome locu-
tions as “a subject relying on the cognitive faculties of the left [or right] hemisphere believes,” etc.)
Some of the headline differences, presented very much in shorthand form for present purposes, are
1. The LH is concerned with manipulation of the environment; the RH is concerned with under-
standing the environment as a whole and how to relate to it (e.g., Desmedt, 1977; Gitelman et al.,
1996; Goebel et al., 1997).
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2. The RH is better at detecting and dealing with novel stimuli, whatever the modality; as they
become more familiar they are processed by the LH (Goldberg & Costa, 1981). The RH deals
with information from the periphery or background; the LH deals preferentially with what is
central and in the foreground (Ellis, Jordan, & Sullivan, 2006; Schutz, 2005).
3. The LH aims to narrow things down to a certainty, while the RH opens them up into possibility.
The RH is able to sustain ambiguity and the holding together of information that appears to
have contrary implications, without having to make an “either/or” decision, and to collapse
it, as the LH tends to do, into a certainty (e.g., Brownell, Simpson, Bihrle, Potter, & Gardner,
1990; Richards & Chiarello, 1997; Tucker & Williamson, 1984). VS Ramachandran calls the
RH the “devil’s advocate” (Ramachandran, 1994), since it acts as an “anomaly detector,” on
the look-out for what might be erroneously assumed by the LH to be familiar. Indeed, its
style is altogether more tentative (Cutting, 1997; Gazzaniga & LeDoux, 1978).
4. The LH tends to see things as isolated, discrete, fragmentary, where the RH tends to see things as
interconnected wholes (e.g., Navon, 1977; Nebes, 1978; Tucker, 1992; Zaidel, 1985).
5. The LH’s world tends towards fixity, and stasis, whereas that of the RH tends towards change
and flow (Bender, Feldman, & Sobin, 1968; Corballis, 1996; Corballis, Boyd, Schulze, & Ruther-
ford, 1998; Ritsema & Murphy, 2007; Schwartz, Assal, Valenza, Seghier, & Vuilleumier, 2005).
All things animate and inanimate—molecules, crystals, cells, cultures and human societies—
depend on a proper balance of these properties.
6. The LH tends to see things as put together mechanically from pieces, and sees the parts, rather
than the complex whole that the RH sees (Anderson, 1990; Bradshaw & Nettleton, 1981, 1983;
Gainotti, 2000; Hécaen & de Ajuriaguerra, 1952).
7. Machines and tools are alone coded in the LH (Gainotti, 2002), and the inanimate is preferen-
tially coded in the LH, while the animate is coded by both hemispheres, though preferentially by
the RH (Price & Friston, 2002).
8. The LH tends to see things as explicit and decontextualized, whereas the RH tends to see them as
implicit and embedded in a context (Alexander, Benson, & Stuss, 1989; Federmeier & Kutas,
1999; Heilman, Scholes, & Watson, 1975; Kinsbourne, 1988). The LH fails to understand meta-
phor, myth, irony, tone of voice, jokes and poetry, and takes meaning literally (Anaki, Faust, &
Kravetz, 1988a, 1988b; Kaplan, Brownell, Jacobs, & Gardner, 1990; Shamay-Tsoory, Tomer, &
Aharon-Peretz, 2005; Shammi & Stuss, 1999; Winner & Gardner, 1977).
9. The RH understands narrative (Hough, 1990; Schneiderman, Murasugi, & Saddy, 1992): the LH,
if offered a story whose episodes are taken out of order, will regroup them so as to classify similar
episodes together, rather than reconstruct them in the order that has human meaning (McNeill,
1992, pp. 345–52).
10. Both hemispheres need to categorize, but do so according to different strategies. The LH tends to
categorize using the presence or absence of a particular feature; the RH tends to do so by refer-
ence to unique exemplars, using a “family resemblance” (Wittgenstein, 1967) approach (Bur-
gund & Marsolek, 2000; Laeng, Zarrinpar, & Kosslyn, 2003). Superordinate (more general)
categories are dealt with preferentially by the LH, subordinate (more fine-grained) categories
by the RH (Grossman, 1981; Laeng et al., 2003). Damage to the RH can lead to a loss of the
sense of uniqueness or the capacity to recognize individuals (e.g., Cutting, 1997).
11. The RH contains the body image (not just a visual image, but a multimodal schema of the body
as a whole) (Joseph, 1988). The RH has richer connections with the limbic system, the hypo-
thalamic–pituitary–adrenal axis and the body generally, and tends to process in a more embo-
died, less abstract fashion than the LH (e.g., Spence, Shapiro, & Zaidel, 1996; Yokoyama,
Jennings, Ackles, Hood, & Boller, 1987). It is also superior at reading body language and
emotion expressed in the face or voice (e.g., Blonder, Bowers, & Heilman, 1991; Narumoto,
Okada, Sadato, Fukui, & Yonekura, 2001).
12. The LH is superior for fine analytic sequencing and has a larger vocabulary and more complex
syntax than the RH (Querné, Eustache, & Faure, 2000). Pragmatics, the ability to understand the
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overall import of an utterance in context, is a RH function (e.g., Foldi, 1987). Understanding
prosody, the musical aspect of language, its tone, inflection, etc., depends, like music itself to
a very large extent, on the RH (Blonder et al., 1991).
13. The RH is essential for “theory of mind” (e.g., Happé, Brownell, & Winner, 1999; McCabe,
Houser, Ryan, Smith, & Trouard, 2001; Stone, Baron-Cohen, Calder, Keane, & Young, 2003).
It is better able to understand an other’s point of view, and to empathize (Decety & Chaminade,
2003; Drake & Bingham, 1985). It makes moral judgments on the basis of the intention of the
doer, the LH on the basis of the consequences of the deed. The LH tends to utilitarianism, the
RH to deontology (Miller et al., 2010; Young, Camprodon, Hauser, Pascual-Leone, & Saxe,
2010).
14. In general terms, both emotional receptivity (e.g., Borod et al., 1990; Suberi & McKeever, 1977)
and expressivity (eg Sackeim et al., 1982) are greater in the RH.
15. The sense of beauty is preponderantly dependent on the RH (Di Dio, Macaluso, & Rizzolatti,
2007; Habib, 1986; Nadal, Munar, Capó, Rosselló, & Cela-Conde, 2008; Vartanian & Goel,
2004).
16. The RH is better at seeing things as they are preconceptually—fresh, unique, embodied and as
they “presence” (Heidegger, anwesen) to us. The left, then, sees things as they are “re-presented,”
literally “present again” after the fact, as already familiar abstractions or signs (Bellugi, Poizner,
& Klima, 1983; Goldberg, 2001; Goldberg & Costa, 1981). In a sense, the LH is the hemisphere of
theory, the RH that of experience; the LH that of the map, the RH that of the terrain.
17. The LH is, unreasonably optimistic, and it lacks insight into its limitations (Drake & Bingham,
1985; Schacter, Glisky, & McGlynn, 1990; Schutz, 2005; Stuss, 1991). The RH is more realistic,
but tends towards the pessimistic.
These could be understood (as seen by the LH) as 17 separate distinctions. But they are in fact
(and as the RH would see them) just an arbitrary number of attempts to give different sidelights
on two distinct, self-coherent versions of the world.
In one (the LH version), as in a map, things are simplified. Here there are familiar, reliable,
clear, certain, static, isolated, fragmentary elements that can be manipulated easily, are decontex-
tualized, abstracted, detached, disembodied, mechanical, relatively uncomplicated by issues of
beauty and morality (except in a consequentialist sense) and relatively untroubled by the complex-
ity of empathy, emotion and human significance. They are put together, like brick on brick to
build a wall, so as to reach conclusions that are taken to be unimpeachable. There is an excess
of confidence and a lack of insight. This world is useful for purposes of manipulation, but is
not a helpful guide to understanding the nature of the underlying reality. Its use is local and
for the short-term.
In the other (the RH version), which is truer to the world revealed to us by physics, by poetry and
simply by the business of living, things are almost infinitely more complex. Nothing is clearly the
same as anything else. All is tentative, uncertain, provisional, and complexly interconnected with
everything else. Nothing is ever static, detached from our awareness of it, or disembodied, and every-
thing needs to be understood in context, where, if it is not to be denatured, it must remain implicit.
Here, wholes are more than the sum of the parts, and beauty and morality, along with empathy and
emotional depth, help us to intuit meaning that lies beyond the banality of the familiar and everyday.
The overall timbre is sober and tentative. This world is truer to what is, but is harder to comprehend
and to express in language, and less useful for practical issues that are local and short-term. On the
other hand, for a broader or longer-term understanding it is essential.
Clearly under normal circumstances we are not aware that the world we experience is a synthesis
of these two phenomenological versions or “takes.” However, it is not just under artificial, exper-
imental conditions, or in illness or injury, that their existence becomes apparent. Every attempt to
reflect on life, understand the world or convey its true nature in language—in other words, every
project of philosophy or theology—is an attempt to reconcile fundamentally incompatible models
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of the world, each of which can claim to reveal aspects of underlying reality. These attempts can, I
suggest, be illuminated by an awareness of the conflicting models of the world yielded by the two
hemispheres of our brains.
2. Implications of right hemisphere phenomenology for the religious life
I will deal with the implications under three (inevitably, artificially distinct) headings: metaphysical
issues, those concerned with the nature of reality; epistemological issues, those concerned with how
we approach an understanding of that reality; and what one might call, very broadly, ethical issues,
consequences for the way we are disposed towards, and act in, the world.







I begin with this, and a consideration of what I have chosen to call “betweenness,” because,
although metaphysical issues, they are also foundational for considerations of epistemology and
ethics.
Whatever else the divine may be, it is different in kind from everyday objects of experience, even if
it may be seen as manifesting in those objects. It is not clear, known and familiar in the same sense
that, say, a table is. It is intrinsically “Other,” not limited by the conceptions or words we bring to
bear on it. Indeed, in some traditions it is precisely that which cannot be grasped by our thinking
faculty or expressed in language, and that which can be so grasped or expressed is by definition
not the divine. Compare the “tao that can be named is not the eternal tao” of Lao Tzu, the “si com-
prehendis, non est Deus” [“if you have understood, it is not God (that you have understood)”] of St
Augustine, and, in more general terms, the apophatic tradition or via negativa in Christian and other
theologies.
Research suggests that all new experience of whatever kind—whether it be of music, words, real-
life objects, or imaginary constructs—preferentially engages the RH, not the LH. In this sense “new”
includes everything that is not already represented as familiar. As and when it is seen as familiar, it
begins to engage the LH. Since the RH is vigilant for whatever it is that exists “out there,” it alone can
help us to apprehend something other than what we already know. The LH is more efficient in rou-
tine situations where things are predictable, but less efficient than the RH wherever the initial
assumptions have to be revised. The referents of the LH are clear, known and familiar by contrast
with those of the RH.
The world made available by the LH appears to be hermetic. Elegant research reveals that the LH
sees truth as internal consistency within a system, even when this demands acceptance of what from
experience cannot be the case (Deglin & Kinsbourne, 1996). By contrast the RH privileges truth to
experience. The RH’s world is open, since the attention which grounds it is vigilant and alert for
whatever might be, as far as possible without presupposition. The approach of the RH is more recep-
tive. In relation to an apprehension of the divine, it is more capable of what Keats called “negative
capability,” the disposition of the creative mind, which he felt Shakespeare possessed in the greatest
measure, “that is when man is capable of being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without any irri-
table reaching after fact and reason.”
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Research has repeatedly and dramatically shown that highly focussed attention, the type offered
by the LH, makes us incapable of seeing even the most glaring elements of our environment if they
are not immediately relevant to the task in hand, or do not fit our expectations (e.g., Simons & Chab-
ris, 1999). The LH is thus relatively incapable of the tentative, “care-ful” (Heidegger, fürsorgend),
reaching out towards what lies beyond what we think we already know. This is true whether one
thinks of the Other as God, or merely as all else that exists. If intimations of its nature are inevitably
implicit, and cannot be made explicit, the LH will not be capable of detecting or interpreting them.
2. “Betweenness”
If we adopt a LH approach to the structure of the world, we look narrowly. Analytic discourse
aims to break things down into constituent parts, clarify what the parts are “in themselves,” and
reconstitute the entity in question by putting the bits together again. While this helps to understand
a man-made entity such as a machine—since a machine is put together in the way this mode of
understanding aims to simulate—it works only in a limited, and potentially misleading, way for
organic entities where there are no separable elements, and where such elements as can be identified
are not best understood in isolation.
In the world according to the RH, there is not a collection of things, pre-existing their relation-
ship. There are, it seems, primarily relationships, since entities become what they are only through
their situation in a context. All entities are essentially interconnected, changing, flowing, ungrasp-
able. This corresponds to the nature of music, in which single notes have in and of themselves no
meaning, nor do the gaps between the notes (in time) that create the melody, nor the gaps between
them (at a moment in time) which create the harmony, yet the whole piece when heard is pregnant
with meaning. It also reflects the reality of modern physics, where particles change their nature with
context, are ultimately entangled, resist precise measurement, and in combination give rise to
phenomena with qualities nowhere discoverable in the constituent parts. In neither music nor phy-
sics can space be considered “empty.” Indeed, the idea of relationship could be reformulated as what
I call “betweenness”—not the relative positions of A and B, nor what exists “in the space between” A
and B, not even A and B and this “space” taken together, but all this together with the something
entirely new that inevitably emerges from their conjunction. These ideas are reflected in the Hegelian
idea of synthetic sublation (Aufhebung).
Although this is primarily a metaphysical issue, it has clear epistemological and ethical impli-
cations. It means that the attempt to isolate entities to see what they in themselves “really” are
will not succeed. It emphasizes that meaning arises from a whole context, and that making some-
thing explicit changes the nature of the entity, by artificially isolating and foregrounding it: thus
poetry, metaphor, ritual and humor (as well as experiences such as erotic love) lose their meaning
when paraphrased, “explained” or put under the spotlight of attention. Indirect or implicit means
are more likely than direct or explicit means to succeed where religious truth is involved, for the
same reason that such implicit means are required by art: the need to reach beyond the banal to
which ordinary explicit language constantly returns us (“Compared with music all communication
by words is shameless; words dilute and brutalise; words depersonalise; words make the uncommon
common”: Nietzsche, 1968).
If, as in the world made available by the RH, nothing is ever repeated or precisely the same as
anything else, all is unique and fresh. Creativity is part of the nature of this world—not an occasional,
or originating, act, but at the core of all existence. And, everything being essentially new and unique,
it is better understood by the RH and by its preferred (indirect) means of understanding—narrative,
metaphor, myth—than explicit means such as analytic discourse, which cannot deal with the unique,
and return us to the familiar and general.
Similarly, if, as in the world made available by the RH, all is connected, the observer, too, is con-
nected to what he or she observes. The act of observation plays a part in the construction of reality.
For this reason alone, there are ethical consequences to every one of our actions or imaginings: it is a
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demonstrable fact that just thinking about certain topics, situations or types of people can alter our
judgments and our behavior, making us more like the object of our imagining (e.g., Dijksterhuis &
van Knippenberg, 1998; Pendry & Carrick, 2001). We are co-creators of ourselves and of “whatever-
it-is-that-exists-apart-from-ourselves.”
Further, if we are literally connected to everything else, although we are entitled to see ourselves as
individuals—much as there are sub-atomic particles—we are equally inseparable from others. As
particles will sometimes behave independently, and sometimes as part of patterns or forms greater
than themselves (eg, waves), so we can see ourselves as partly individual and partly subsumed into a
greater whole for which we have responsibility—suggesting a calling and “re-sponding,” a two-way,
reverberative, rather than unidirectional and linear, process.
3. Paradox
The RH is more capable of holding together apparently conflicting positions (as the LH would see
them), more at ease with ambiguity and conflicting interpretations. It is thus less susceptible to the
need to determine truth in an “either/or” fashion. Such ambiguities and “conflicts” of meaning or
reasoning lie at the core of the mystical tradition, which is famously reliant on paradox to convey
truths that transcend our everyday understanding.
In addition, paradox is often the consequence of bringing the LH’s version of the world into sharp
contrast with that of the RH. As will be apparent from the Introduction to this paper, these versions
are according to our normal way of thinking incompossible (e.g., a thing cannot be both static and in
motion, separate and connected, divisible and indivisible, precisely measurable and intrinsically
imprecise, at the same time). However, one way of seeing the sorites paradox, the ship of Theseus
paradox, the growing paradox, Achilles and the tortoise, the dichotomy paradox, the arrow paradox
and many others is that they turn on a conflict of precisely this nature, between the mode of appre-
hension of the LH and that of the RH—in particular, whether the whole is merely the sum of its parts,
as the LH sees it, or, as the RH sees it, a Gestalt in its own right. Others, such as the Cretan liar para-
dox, depend on the LH failing to take into account contextual framing, and relying on an inappropri-
ate (because self-defeating) demand for inflexibility in the pragmatics of utterance.
The nature of mystical truths is that they refer to that area lying outside the familiar and everyday
where the LH view is by its nature least reliable. But all truths of a metaphysical kind, concerning “the
way things are,” will be best understood by the RH, the one that is turned outwards on the world for
apprehension of whatever might be, and is less likely to ignore—simply not see—whatever does not
fit the paradigm it already holds.
4. Causation
The RH processes in parallel and as a whole rather than, as the LH does, serially and by parts.
Hume’s attack on the idea of causation, and his substitution of the idea of conjunction, may rep-
resent a recognition of the RH’s non-linear way of understanding, in which things are related
when they co-occur without necessarily implying causation. For example, classical conditioning
posits that a stimulus (ringing a bell, previously associated with the provision of food) produces a
“conditioned response” in Pavlov’s dog (salivation). This is thought of as a linear process, the
arrow hitting its target. Thus the dog is reduced to a machine. But a slightly different way of thinking
of this would be that there is a context to everything, context being a circular, concentric concept,
rather than a linear one. If one imagines Pavlov’s dog, in a different experiment, having repeated
experience of the bell being rung some time after it has started eating, rather than just before it
gets food, one would have to say that, when the dog hears the bell in the absence of food, it experi-
ences an association (a mini-context) in which these two events tend to co-occur. It would have as
much reason to start to salivate when it heard the bell, but in doing so it would appear less mech-
anical, less as though its behavior were caused by the bell. The dog is reduced to a mechanism by the
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temporal sequencing, an essential part of the concept of causation, and by the stripping away of the
context to focus on a sequence.
Equally constraints are not the same as causes. Understanding the structure of the brain and how
it functions can help us see the constraints on experience, much as the banks of a river constrain its
flow and are integral to its being a river at all, without themselves being sufficient to cause the river,
or being themselves the river, or explaining it away. All experience in this life as we know it (and this
applies whether we conceive the brain as the originator, or as a transducer, of consciousness) comes
to us through the brain, and is therefore inevitably constrained, and shaped, by it. This is most
obvious to us through there being many elements of our environment—certain pitches of sound, cer-
tain wavelengths of light, for example—that, though detectable by the brains of other animals, are not
detectable by ours. It also becomes obvious when, through some stroke, injury or other brain insult,
aspects of normal experience disappear from the subject’s world. But it does not make the brain
causative.
The attempt to decide whether changes in the brain cause changes in consciousness or changes in
consciousness cause changes in the brain may be mistaken. It does not have to be either, much as the
movement of water does not “cause” the wave, nor the wave “cause” the movement of water. Serial
processing introduces a question of temporality which may, however, reflect an aspect of the model,
rather than of the underlying reality the model is designed to illuminate.
5. Embodiment
As Merleau-Ponty suggested, and as Lakoff & Johnson have more recently emphasized (Lakoff &
Johnson, 1999), everything we know is embodied and cannot be abstracted without distorting its
essential nature. That spirit and body are not distinct, or opposed, but discernibly different aspects
of the same being, is expressed in many traditions through embodied spiritual practices, such as
meditation and prayer in conjunction with the assumption of bodily postures. It is also implicit
in the existence of holy places, such as shrines, and in holy objects, such as icons. Above all, ritual,
which is common to perhaps all religions, is the enactment of embodied metaphor. This does not
deny that many traditions, and perhaps particularly the Christian tradition, have had an ambivalence
towards the body: the doctrines of incarnation and resurrection of the body appear to assert the inse-
parability of soul and body, while ascetics (of all traditions, but perhaps particularly of the Christian
tradition) have emphasized the abject nature of the flesh.
The RH is more united with the body than the LH in at least four respects. First, the LH abstracts
(from context), and the body is the context of our mental world. What is present in all its embodi-
ment to the RH becomes a re-presentation, a relatively abstract sign, in the LH. Second, the body
image, which is not a static visual image, but a kinaesthetic image in all sensory modalities, lies in
the RH. The LH has no such image. Third, in the RH there are richer and more profuse connections
between the cortex and the limbic system, the part of the brain that “processes” emotion (which is
itself intrinsically an embodied experience), and the hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenal axis, which
governs autonomic activity throughout the body. Fourth, the RH is more adept at reading embodied
expression, whether in the prosody of speech, or in the face, or in the body as a whole.
Summary
The divine is by definition something “Other.” Contemporary physics confirms the understand-
ing of the world that has been central to the humanities for centuries, and is enshrined in many of the
world’s cosmologies—that, however we may usefully distinguish entities (“The 10,000 things”),
everything is connected (“All is one”). It also confirms that ultimate reality is paradoxical, as,
again, the humanities and the great spiritual traditions of the world affirm. Causation may be an illu-
sion of a certain way of thinking about the world in time. All experience—even the most abstract of
thinking—is embodied in nature, and nothing can be separated from its material context without
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distorting its nature. In all these respects, the RH is more capable of apprehending the nature of the
world and the possible role of the divine in it than is the LH.
B. Epistemological issues
1. Knowledge, belief and truth
2. The implicit and mythos v the explicit and logos
3. Meditation and mindfulness
4. Negation
5. “Active passivity”
1. Knowledge, belief and truth
Since the nature of the world that is brought into being by LH attention is different from that
brought into being by RH attention, the type of knowledge favored by each hemisphere also
differs. The LH “knows” the world in a way that is most appropriate to the non-living: it amasses
“pieces” of information, which are relatively general, impersonal, fixed, certain and the product of
a disengaged stance. The RH “knows” the world in a way more appropriate to living beings: it recog-
nizes unique individuals, resists generalization, and its knowledge is personal, comes from experi-
ence, depends on betweenness (an encounter), is relatively unfixed and uncertain, and harder to
capture in language. Here the whole is not best understood by summing the parts. With the notable
exception of English, this distinction between two kinds of knowing is generally enshrined in the
language: for example, in French savoir/connaître, in German wissen/kennen.
The distinction could also be seen as that between propositional knowledge and knowledge by
encounter. Belief is also subject to such a distinction. Nowadays belief is often viewed as simply a
feeble form of knowing, as in “I believe (but am not certain that) the train leaves at 6.13.” But
this has not always been the case. Belief is historically not a matter of cognition, but of recognition.
The word comes from the same root as the word “love,” a sense preserved in the now archaic word
“lief,” familiar to us from Shakespeare, with which one once described one’s friend, sweetheart, or
lord—someone in whom one believed. Similar considerations apply to the German glauben (related
to lieben, to love), and to the French croire and other derivatives of Latin credere, a word which meant
originally to “entrust to the care of” (the sense lingers, in reduced fashion, in the idea of “credit”).
Belief is about a relationship, in which by definition, more than one party is involved. The believer
needs to be disposed to love, but the believed-in needs to inspire another’s belief. Whether this
amounts to being worthy of that belief cannot be fully determined in advance. It emerges through
commitment and experience.
Belief does imply truth, but historically truth was no more propositional than belief. The word
“true” brings us to an encounter, a relationship: like the German treu (faithful), with which it is cog-
nate, it is related to “trust,” and is fundamentally a matter of what one trusts or believes. The Latin
word verum (true) is cognate with a Sanskrit word meaning to choose or believe: like one’s loved one,
the one in whom one chooses to believe and place one’s trust, to whom one is true. We still speak of
two surfaces that “marry” well as being true. Fidelity is implicit in the concept.
Etymology maps the slippage of thought. What it shows in this case is three revealing shifts. First,
the words “truth” and “belief” used to describe a reverberative or two-directional relationship, in
which each party is “re-sponsible” for the fit. Truth and belief are no longer relational, but have
become propositional. The causation is no longer distributed, but linear. Second, it suggests that
truth and belief used to be embodied actions or processes, involving commitment, not (as they
are now conceived) detached, disembodied “things.” Third, as processes, truth and belief derived
their value from the context, could never be absolute, and were never single or static. The idea of
truth as independent of us, immutable and certain, is a recent invention.
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It will be recognized from the above that the shift has been one from RH understanding of knowl-
edge, belief and truth, towards, in each case, that of the LH. However, this shift may not have served
us well in some respects. It may be that an understanding that enables evaluation of knowledge, belief
or truth cannot always be achieved by simply sitting back and waiting passively for information to
accumulate, since some truths become understandable only when we have made a move to meet
them. They are incremental and come with experience. There are good reasons to suppose that
this is the case in approaching the divine.
2. The implicit and mythos v the explicit and logos
In the Greek world, a linguistic distinction was also made between different kinds of truth,mythos
and logos. Mythos did not have the negative connotations associated with our word “myth,”
suggesting untruth, but was seen as indeed the only way of accessing certain kinds of truth about
the world. Logos, equivalent to reason in the broadest possible sense, could serve some purposes,
but not others. This understanding has been partially recaptured in certain streams of modern phil-
osophy, with an awareness that knowledge cannot get behind or beyond the models or metaphors
which it chooses to employ, and that models or metaphors are intrinsic to all understanding, includ-
ing those for which the greatest claims of objectivity can be made. Models and metaphors are an
expression of mythos, and both ground the reasoning process at the most fundamental level and
enable an understanding of it in context at the highest level. Far from being dispensable, or,
worse, misleading, they are the foundations of all knowledge.
Where the RH can see that metaphor is the only way to preserve the link between language and
the world it refers to, the LH sees it either as a lie (Locke, expressing Enlightenment disdain, called
metaphors “perfect cheats”: Locke, 1690/1849, III, x, §34) or as a distracting ornament; and conno-
tation as a limitation, since in the interests of certainty the LH prefers single meanings.
The RH does not have to collapse experience quickly to the familiar. It can allow the intuited and
implicit to lead us out of what I (2009) have called “the hall of mirrors” of the LH (a reference to its
self-referring, hermetic nature). The RH understands metaphor, myth, narrative, music and poetry,
faculties that are grossly impaired in people with RH damage. The richness of these implicit paths to
knowledge, which also include drama and ritual, opens up an understanding of whatever cannot be
explicitly stated without violence to its subject. Such means are essential to conveying religious truth.
3. Meditation and mindfulness
Meditation and mindfulness are practices that engage mind and body with the purpose of altering
awareness. One shared aim of most such practices is to still the constant stream of inner discourse
and judgment about experience (known in the Buddhist tradition as xinyuan or shin’en, usually
translated as “monkey mind”) and achieve a direct awareness of experience itself. Stilling the process
of verbalizing and conscious judgment would require engagement of the LH, particularly the left
frontal cortex, both in order to inhibit posterior cortex in the same hemisphere engaged in language
processing and conscious judgment formation, and to lock focussed attention to a single target, in
such a way as to prevent it engaging in the examination of experience. (I am reminded of T.S. Eliot’s
remark that the surface “meaning” of a poem is like the meat that the burglar tosses the dog, while he
gets on with burgling the house: Eliot, 1975). The achievement of blissful states would be
accompanied by increased activation of the left frontal pole, which has a strong association with posi-
tive emotional states. On the other hand, sustaining attention, whether narrow or broad in focus,
requires recruiting RH vigilance; compassion meditation requires engagement of the right frontal
cortex; and mindfulness, an attempt to encounter experience behind and beyond verbalization
and conceptualization, should also engage widely distributed networks principally in the RH.
Thus one would expect to see both hemispheres engaged in meditation, although the desired state
of mind involves opening up to the RH’s way of being.
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These predictions are broadly in keeping with findings on scanning (Berkovich-Ohana, Glick-
sohn, & Goldstein, 2012, 2014; Hölzel et al., 2007; Hölzel, Carmody, et al., 2011; Hölzel, Lazar,
2011; Leung et al., 2013; Luders et al., 2012; Thomas, Jamieson, & Cohen, 2014)
However, imaging meditation is associated with a number of methodological problems. As
suggested above, much of the brain activity which is detected is likely to be inhibitory, rather
than facilitatory, in nature. Areas in either hemisphere associated with internal monitoring, irrespec-
tive of the task, will also tend to be active. Moreover, the more practiced the meditator, the less key
brain areas involved will appear to be active, since metabolism is a measure of effort, proportionate to
the difficulty of the task, and the easier the task becomes, the less effort is required. And there are
inevitable contextual differences in meditating while being monitored, and being aware of being
monitored (not least because of the apparatus involved in doing the measurement), which dis-
tinguish it from meditation under normal conditions.
At the level of phenomenology, meditation and mindfulness succeed primarily by freeing RH
consciousness from LH processing. The one exception to this is “blissful mind” meditation, which
one would expect to cause excitation of the left frontal pole, known to be associated with “positive”
emotion (Newberg, d’Aquili, & Rause, 2001). Research by Newberg and colleagues underlines that
this excitation of the left frontal pole is strongly correlated with suppression of the superior parietal
region in the same hemisphere (Newberg, Alavi, et al., 2001; Newberg, Pourdehnad, Alavi, &
d’Aquili, 2003). In relation to this, it is a possibility that, since meditation of all kinds depends on
stilling the normal verbalizing activity of the left posterior cortex, the blissful state achieved by
some meditators is an (initially incidental) consequence of learning how maximally to recruit the
left frontal pole.
4. Negation
A constant feature of all mystical traditions is an emphasis on the creative power of silence and
stillness. Value is placed on emptiness, non-doing, unknowing and receptivity, as opposed to know-
ing, willing and acting. This openness to what is, without will or need to act, is more characteristic of
the mode of attention to the world of the RH than the LH, whose nature is to establish, as far as
possible, certainties and to will purposive action.
It is also part of most religious traditions that negation can be creative. As Sherrington pointed
out, fine sensorimotor control is made possible by pairs of what he called “opponent processors”
(Sherrington, 1906). Essentially a relationship of co-operative opposition allows each “opponent pro-
cessor” to inhibit the other in the interests of achieving finely-tuned outcomes. Kinsbourne has
suggested that brain function, too, can be seen as depending on three pairs of opponent processors:
the frontal lobes in equilibrium with the posterior cortex; the cortex with subcortical regions; and
each hemisphere with the other (Kinsbourne, 1988). The frontal cortex’s main function is to inhibit
posterior cortex, principally that of the same hemisphere; out of this much that is distinctively
human arises.
The Greek word for truth aletheiameans an “un-covering” or “dis-closure” (Heidegger), therefore
an “opening up” or “dis-covery,” of something pre-existing that was obscured but now reveals itself.
The creative act, in the sense that it achieves contact with the Other, rather than simply re-arranges
what is already known, is, like sculpture, a clearing away of something in order that something else
may be revealed. It is not achieved by a process of linear augmentation, putting something together
piece by piece, as one builds a wall. In Spinoza’s phrase, determinatio negatio est, a phrase later taken
up by Hegel as omnis determinatio est negatio (“all determination is negation”): making something
more precisely what it is demands the exclusion of whatever is extraneous to it.
The central nervous system models this at several levels. At the most basic, the brain is shaped by
a process of neuronal “pruning” that begins before birth. Neuronal loss is as important for proper
functioning as axonal growth. At a later stage some possible pathways are strengthened at the
expense of others which become harder to activate. At the level of conscious awareness, the
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phenomenological world is inevitably brought about through progressive selective attention to an
abundance of stimuli, first through a filtering at the level of preconscious awareness, where the
RH plays a primary role (it preferentially processes new and unfamiliar experience), and then by
the further restriction involved in focussing on salient stimuli by the LH.
The emphasis in spiritual traditions on “emptying out” and “unknowing,” on the illusory nature
of what is most easily grasped, could be seen as resisting the LH process of closing down to a familiar
certainty and recruiting the RH tendency to open up to an unfamiliar possibility, a determination
against determinations. Stillness and silence become not just absences, but rich potential spaces
for something that otherwise would be excluded. In this respect it is interesting that in the Lurianic
Kabbalah the first act of creation by Einsof, the primary Being, is known as tzimtzum, or “withdra-
wal,” in order to permit something else to come into being. The Buddhist saying that “the greatest
prayer is patience” places letting go, reticence, withholding judgment and acceptance ahead of striv-
ing, judging and knowing, at the core of spiritual wisdom. In as much as the LH is the locus of con-
scious control and manipulation, and the RH the locus of openness to what is, this suggests the
primacy of RH modes of attention in the spiritual life.
5. “Active passivity”
The “emptiness” referred to, or sunyata (the word comes from a Sanskrit root sva which indicates
the hollowness of a ripening seed), the non-doing and the unknowing are not simply vacuity, pas-
sivity and ignorance, but contain within themselves the potential of their opposite poles, fullness,
action, and knowing. A development of this idea, which is familiar within the mystical tradition,
is also found outside it, as “active passivity,” a concept that in different ways is central to both the
poetry of Wordsworth (who referred to “wise passiveness”) and the philosophy of Heidegger. In
the opening of Book XII of his long poem The Prelude, Wordsworth describes how inspiration
requires both the effort by which the mind “aspires, grasps, struggles, wishes, craves” and the stillness
of the mind which “fits him to receive it, when unsought.” Note that despite the necessity of effort,
inspiration still only comes when unsought. In this it is like the conscious attempt to remember,
whereby we struggle to recapture, say, a name, which only later comes unbidden once we cease to
make the effort. De Quincey tells a story of Wordsworth, during the time of the Peninsular War,
walking out at night to meet the mail coach from Keswick that would bring eagerly awaited news
(De Quincey, 1851). Lying full stretch on the road so that he could put his ear to it and pick up
the distant rumbling that would indicate the approach of the mail, his eye happened to chance on
a bright star glittering between the brow of Seat Sandal and Helvellyn, and struck him suddenly
“with a pathos and a sense of the infinite, that would not have arrested me under other circum-
stances.” The vision comes because of an effort made and then relaxed. It is as if explicit intention
to the star would have obscured Wordsworth’s sight, the object falling on the blind spot at the center
of the field of vision, and it was only when his intention was strongly fixated on something else that
he could see things as they really are.
Narrowly focussed attention is the province of the LH, and an increase in stress, fear and excitement
actually inhibits the spread of neuronal recruitment in a manner that favors this very closely targeted
kind of attention within the LH (Corbetta, Miezin, Dobmeyer, Shulman, & Petersen, 1991). This is the
explanation of the “tip of the tongue” phenomenon: the word only comes when LH effortfulness
ceases. Yet while the LH is preoccupied with its quarry, like Eliot’s dog with its meat, the RH is actually
freed, its vigilance also in a state of enhancement, to see the scene afresh, once more authentic, not
overlaid by the familiarity that the LH would normally bring to the scene. Attending in LH mode
to the scene in front of him, Wordsworth would have been compelled to pre-digest it, so to speak,
into another picturesque scene of mountains, lakes or starry skies. The initial effort of close attention
is needed, but, its work done, it must give way to an open receptivity, a sort of active passivity.
The stance, or disposition, that we need to adopt for reality to disclose itself is not just an attitude
of “waiting for,” according to Heidegger, but one of “waiting on” (nachdenken) whatever it is; a
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patient, respectful nurturing of something into disclosure, in which we need already to have some
idea of what it is that will be. George Steiner compares it to “that ‘bending toward’ of spirit and intel-
lect and ear” to be seen in Fra Angelico’s Annunciation in San Marco. A highly active passivity, in
other words. There is a process of responsiveness between man (Dasein, literally “being there,” or
perhaps “the being that is in the world”) and Being, which is well described by George Steiner in
a key passage of his book on Heidegger (Steiner, 1978):
An Ent-sprechen is not “an answer to” (une réponse à), but a “response to”, a “corre- spondence with”, a dynamic
reciprocity and matching such as occur when gears, both in quick motion, mesh. Thus, our question as to the
nature of philosophy calls not for an answer in the sense of a textbook definition or formulation, be it Platonic,
Cartesian, or Lockeian, but for an Ent-sprechung, a response, a vital echo, a “re-sponsion” in the liturgical sense of
participatory engagement … For Descartes, truth is determined and validated by certainty. Certainty, in turn, is
located in the ego. The self becomes the hub of reality and relates to the world outside itself in an exploratory,
necessarily exploitative, way. As knower and user, the ego is predator. For Heidegger, on the contrary, the
human person and self-consciousness are not the centre, the assessors of existence. Man is only a privileged lis-
tener and respondent to existence. The vital relation to otherness is not, as for Cartesian and positivist rational-
ism, one of “grasping” and pragmatic use. It is a relation of audition.We are trying “to listen to the voice of Being”.
It is, or ought to be, a relation of extreme responsibility, custodianship, answerability to and for.
Openness to Being provides the space in which creation happens. We can’t make it happen, but our
“ad-tention” is required, whereby we reach out to partake in, and shape its happening.
Summary
From the consideration of metaphysical issues in section A above, some epistemological issues are
already raised. A world characterized by “betweenness,” and in which paradox cannot at times be
avoided, will not be best understood by a process of analysis. Serial processing leads to possibly arte-
factual issues of causation, artefactual because the necessity of temporal priority may be only appar-
ent when issues that by their nature may lie outside of time are approached in linear fashion.
Something that is by definition “Other” will not be best approached by LH attention, which tends
to reduce objects of attention to familiar categories, and is relatively impervious to the essentially
new and unfamiliar. Given that implicit knowledge is best conveyed in embodied, rather than
abstract, form, religious practices will succeed best when they do not eschew embodiment: hence
the importance of ritual itself, and the place of bodily posture in it; the place of poetic language
and music within ritual (every known culture uses music to communicate with the supernatural,
with whatever is by definition above, beyond, “Other than,” our selves); and the presence of holy
places and holy objects (icons or relics). All of these can become targets of reforming zeal within
extreme Protestantism and Islam. Added to this, from section B, it is apparent that the more ancient
understandings of knowledge, belief, and truth, as dispositional rather than as propositional, are
more likely to succeed in giving an account of religious experience, and that such knowledge, beliefs,
and truths will be inadequately conveyed if narratives, metaphors, myths, poetry, music, and ritual
are not central to the process. Furthermore, attempts to understand religious truths by indirect,
potentially paradoxical, modes associated with the RH are more likely to be successful than the direct
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“Betweenness” suggests that the atomistic idea of the self may be an illusion. Our selfhood may be
inseparable from the society of other beings from which it is derived, through which it is enacted, and
to whom it returns. When the boundary between self and other is more permeable, acts that look to
the ego like acts of self-sacrifice, espoused purely for the benefit of others, become more like the
necessary responses of a healthy organism. In a more direct sense still, a disposition of forgiveness,
acceptance, and patience, and the associated self-forgetting, leads (to the perplexity of a more ration-
alist calculus) to self-fulfilment and peace. Nonetheless, by a further twist of paradox (as it may seem
to the goal-orientated approach of the LH), if espoused instrumentally for that reason alone, they will
fail to do so. The difference of the type of attention (instrumental v relational), and the plane of focus
of the attention (self v Other) make all the difference, leading not just to different conceptions of the
self but to a different experience of the world. These differences map onto the modes of being associ-
ated with LH versus RH consciousness.
Louis Lavelle wrote “la charité… est une pure attention à l’existence d’autrui” (Lavelle, 1939). This
other-directed openness which is, according to Lavelle, the essence of love, describes the attention
paid by the RH rather than the LH, whether the object of that attention be another human being
or the divine ground of being itself.
2. Necessary vulnerability
This reflection is put forward tentatively. In themythos of the Master (RH) and his emissary (LH)
is encapsulated the idea of different kinds of knowing that need to be separate, yet held together.
Master and emissary each know things the other does not know: the difference is that the Master
knows more than the emissary, and knows he needs the emissary, whereas the emissary does not
know he needs the Master. For the relationship to work, the Master has to trust the emissary, know-
ing that the trust may be betrayed. This description of their relationship in some ways reflects the
myth of the Fall: the relationship between God and his brightest angel (angelos, literally meaning
“emissary”) Lucifer, whose name means the shining one, and hence between God and man, the
story of Milton’s Paradise Lost. It may be no more than a coincidence that Heidegger uses the
word Verfallen (translated as “falling away”) to describe the inauthentic “everdayness” that would
be the result of dwelling in the always already “re-presented” world of the LH. Be that as it may,
in the Christian mythos of the incarnation lies the idea of the submission of a greater power to a
form of resistance or constraint, in order that something still greater can come about. This pro-
gression of Potentiality to Actuality, Becoming to Being, involves an intrinsic sacrifice or self-limiting
process in the interests of there being an actualized “world” and its beings at all.
3. The dark side
Jung wisely emphasized that there is a dark side to human consciousness, which it is healthy and
healing to accept, and dangerous to deny. The spiritual life and its practices are no exception. In
terms of hemisphere differences this is often consistent with relying too heavily on a LH-congruent
understanding of the world, but it can also come from relying on the RH’s understanding alone. The
Greeks have a saying: “When God builds a church, the Devil builds one right next door.” The worst
excesses can masquerade as a single-minded devotion to the spiritual. Most of these will be obvious.
Attempts to contain bodily desires can become an attack on the body. Fear of “superstition” can
become an attack on the created world and a retreat into abstraction. Spiritual texts can become fro-
zen as the source of the “One Truth.” A belief that there is a “right” way of acting or knowing, and a
desire to “purify” oneself or, much worse, a society, can lead to sterile perfectionism and spiritual
pride, and ultimately to intolerance, fanaticism and aggression. This illustrates how easily a thing
and its opposite can morph into one another, an observation that is commonplace in most religious
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traditions, and accords better with the RH’s awareness that apparent opposites are not mutually
exclusive and sometimes coincide than with the LH’s linear construction of reality whereby more
of something (now, and in this particular context, perceived as good) must be better.
4. Growth through suffering
“A deep distress hath humanised my soul.” So wrote Wordsworth (“Elegiac Stanzas Suggested by
a Picture of Peele Castle in a Storm, painted by Sir George Beaumont”) after his brother John
drowned in the wreck of the “Abergavenny.” According to a linear view, suffering is simply bad,
and a life without any suffering would be the ideal. Such a life is of course impossible, but more
importantly involves a contradiction, since it would require a life equally devoid of pleasure or hap-
piness, which would itself be a form of suffering.
While suffering should not be sought out for its own sake, and all efforts should normally be made
to relieve it, suffering can be “humanising,” deepening experience and enhancing compassion for
others. It is also true that it can lead to embitterment, and preoccupation with the self, but in my
experience as a psychiatrist this is relatively unusual, and is generally a sign of a personality type
that is as much the cause as the result of suffering. Some people who have experienced depression,
epilepsy or psychosis may at times have access to experience of a spiritual nature from which the rest
of us are normally excluded. This is neither to romanticize illnesses that often seem without redeem-
ing features, and destroy lives, nor in any way to underestimate the truly appalling suffering that, for
example, depressive illness can cause. It is worth noting that several lines of evidence link depression
with the right frontal pole, which is also the most important brain region in the development of self-
other relationships and in empathy.
5. Healing
It follows from the conception of mental illness as having a spiritual dimension that spiritual
practices may be involved in healing. The use of mindfulness, a Buddhist meditative practice, is
now widespread in psychiatry, as is cognitive therapy, effectively the formalization of Stoic prac-
tices of self-examination. It is also common practice to engage people with depression, once well
enough, in activities designed to help others, since this decreases introspection, improves feelings
of self-worth and is a powerful way to restore a sense of “meaning” to a life that has lost all such
sense. “Meaning” in this sense is another concept that is better understood by the RH than the
LH.
3. Implications of left hemisphere phenomenology for the religious life
So far I have not explored the contribution of the left hemisphere. Its affinity for what is familiar and
resoluble into parts, rather than “other” and resistant to serial analysis, its characteristic tendency to
need precision and certainty, and its relative intolerance for ambiguity and paradox, taken together
with its relative imperviousness to meaning that lies beyond language, and its tendency to abstrac-
tion, mean that it is unlikely to have the capacity to experience the Divine, or, on reflection, to find
the concept coherent. Despite its relative lack of capacity to engage with the qualities I have con-
sidered above, it must also have a way of approaching the divine. This would be less congenial to
the mystical, more to the systematic. It would prize the written word over the visual image or
music, and would tend to take the written word literally. It would be relatively uneasy with un-know-
ing and would claim certainty. It would lack an understanding of embodied worship, including the
metaphorical nature of icons and statues. It would not see religion as a historical and cultural
phenomenon, with its own context, but would see religion as timeless and universal. It would believe
that religion could be used to control the uncertainties of the future, perhaps through the power of
prayer, and that it would bring its true believers power and material wealth. It would be unable to
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accept the creativity of negation, or active passivity, and would have a belief in its own capacity to
“make things happen.” It would see the dark side as simply to be rejected, suffering as purely nega-
tive. Its tone would be optimistic.
4. Conclusion
In The Master and his Emissary, analysis of a vast neurological literature over many decades concern-
ing hemisphere differences in birds, animals and humans led to the conclusion that the differences
were not in what “functions” the two hemispheres carried out, since both were clearly involved in
every brain process, but in the manner in which they each engaged with the world, especially as
mediated by clear and reliable differences in the kind of attention they paid to it. Since attention
is intrinsic to the nature of the phenomenological world, and since the nature of attention paid
changes the kind of world that comes to attention, it could be expected that each hemisphere
would bring into being its own version of the world, with its own goals, concerns and values.
This means that each hemisphere should have a quite distinct “take” on every aspect of human
experience and behavior. The realm of the religious is no exception to this.
There are reasons to suppose the RH may be more able to mediate religious experience or is more
prone to accept it as a reality, depending on one’s point of view.
Hitherto there has been a tendency in the literature to associate religious experience with activity
in the right frontal and temporoparietal cortex, though at times in the left frontal cortex, the
interpretation of which is open to question (some reflections on the topic are contained in this
paper). People with autism, who in many respects approximate a RH deficit state, are known to
be more inclined to atheism (Bering, 2002; Norenzayan, Gervais, & Trzesniewski, 2012). On phe-
nomenological grounds one would expect the RH to be more open to intimations of the divine
and to adopt a stance that would not automatically rule out the possibility of something beyond
everyday experience and language. This paper offers some reflections on the issues raised, and
suggests that hemisphere differences may cast light on why some avenues of approach to religious
belief and practice are likely to prove more illuminating than others.
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COMMENTARIES
Cerebral lateralization and religion: the roles of ritual and the DMN
Candace S. Alcorta
Department of Anthropology, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT, USA
Introduction
Why humans universally believe in counterintuitive supernatural agents that demand costly and
sometimes deadly sacred rituals of adherents is a question that has long fascinated evolutionary the-
orists. McGilchrist’s cerebral lateralization model of religion offers a new perspective on this ques-
tion. Drawing on a large body of research, he proposes that phenomenological differences between
the two brain hemispheres render the right hemisphere “more likely to be able to accommodate reli-
gious thought and experience.”He views cognitivist theories of religion that fail to integrate affective,
somatic, and spiritual phenomena as incapable of adequately explaining religion. According to
McGilchrist, “arguments about the nature and meaning of religion may depend on which hemi-
sphere’s ‘version’ of the world is privileged.”
Cerebral lateralization
McGilchrist’s model posits a fundamental phenomenological difference between the left and right
hemispheres of the human brain. Clinical and split-brain studies demonstrate hemispheric differ-
ences; ongoing neuroimaging and experimental studies support these findings, as well. Hemispheric
asymmetries have “deep phylogenetic roots’” (Bisazza, Rogers, & Vallortigara, 1998, p. 411); they
occur in fish, reptiles, birds, amphibians, and across numerous species of mammals. Cerebral later-
alization exists at multiple levels, including “the brain’s functional layout, cytoarchitecture and
neurochemistry” (Toga & Thompson, 2003, p. 37), varying “from subtle differences in the size or
synaptic connectivity of neuronal nuclei to more dramatic forms of lateralization in which unique
groups of neurons exist on one side only” (Concha, Bianco, & Wilson, 2012, p. 8320). “The wide-
spread occurrence of CNS [central nervous system] asymmetries in diverse animal species indicates
that this feature of nervous system organization confers a survival advantage” (Gotts et al., 2013,
p. 83). Proposed benefits include: (1) increased neural capacity through specialization and elimin-
ation of duplication, (2) reduction of interference and conflict between the hemispheres with con-
comitant promotion of simultaneous parallel processing, and (3) more rapid and efficient
processing through localization of function. Laboratory experiments in non-human species provide
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